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—  #  :
Be^ue naraa — nepHue naraa: c^oxHue Bonpocu b  poc- 
CHHCKo-no^ bCKHx 0TH0meHHnx / nog o6^. peg. A. B. TopKyHOBa, 
A. ,3,. PoT^e^bga; o t b . peg. A. B. Ma^brHH, M. M. Hapi-mcRi-iii 
[Blank spots — black spots: difficult issues of Russian-Polish rela­
tions /eds. A. V. Torkunov, A. D. Rotfeld, A. V. Malygin, 
M. M. Narinsky]. M.: AcneKT npecc, 2010. 823 c.
The history of Russia-Polish relations in the 20th century was compli­
cated. It was full of blank spots that still provoke heated discussions in civic 
and academic communities. Giving rise to different interpretations of certain 
episodes, they, however, do not constitute the primary reasons for disaccord 
between Poland and Russia. A greater dissonance and distrust in relations 
between the two countries was compounded by crimes, inhumane in their 
cruelty, and lies about them. Lies always lead to distrust, which is a poor ba­
sis for goof relations. The book under review is an attempt to overcome this 
distrust, bereaving Russian-Polish history of biased and ideology-driven in­
terpretations.
This book is truly unique since it was written by a team of Russian and 
Polish scholars — members of the Russian-Polish Group on Difficult Issues. 
The history of the 20th century Russian-Polish relations was divided into pe­
riods described from two points of view. This approach makes a valuable 
contribution to a better understanding of the history of Russia-Polish rela­
tions, since it makes it possible to look at problems from different perspec­
tives. The book addresses a significant number of difficult issues; let us fo­
cus on some of them.
The book opens with a chapter compiled by G. Matveev, D. Nal^cz, 
T. Nal^cz on the initial period of the relations between Poland and Soviet 
Russia. The authors pay special attention to the war of 1919— 1920 and em­
phasise its relation to the Civil war in Russia, the outcome of which de­
pended, inter alia, on the events taking place in Poland. This point of view is 
shared by many contemporary Polish historians1; however, Russian works 
on the issue hardly adopt this point of view.
The chapter also focuses on the destiny of the captive Red Army sol­
diers, which is often brought up in Russian social and political discourse as 
“anti- Katyn”. The authors stress that the war losses of Soviet Russia cannot 
be established due to the absence of trustworthy data, but, according to their 
estimate, approximately 80,000 Red Army soldiers were held captive by Pol­
ish army. Many of them died of diseases, malnutrition, blood loss, and expo­
sure. More than 30,000 captives joined the anti-Soviet troops led by S. Pet-
1 See, for example: Garlicki A. Józef Pilsudski: 1867— 1935. Kraków, 2009. S. 334—335. 
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lyura, A. Salnikov, etc. There were those who decided against returning 
home. But the authors emphasise that neither the Polish, nor the Bolsheviks 
executed prisoners of war, and the notion “anti- Katyn” emerged in the late 
1980s as an attempt to mitigate the effect of the Soviet rejection to recognise 
the Katyn massacre.
The pages of the book serve as a platform for an interesting discussion 
between Polish and Russian historians on the efficiency of the equal distance 
concept, which the Polish government was guided by in the interbellum. The 
Polish scholar, W. Materski stresses possible complications of violating this 
approach. W. Materski’s point of view is opposed by another Polish histo­
rian, S. D^bski, who maintains that Poland’s mistake was not in the fact that 
it pursued the equal distance policy, but in the country’s leadership failure to 
implement it in full. S. D^bski tries to explain the Polish foreign policy of 
the time by the aspiration to act individually in international relations, and 
the aggression against Czechoslovakia was a demarche aimed to undermine 
the attempts of England and France to reach accord with A. Hitler. That 
means that the mistakes made by Polish diplomacy, from the author’s point 
of view, were not of a strategic, but rather a tactical nature.
The Russian scholar, M. M. Narinsky, starts a polemic discussion with 
the Polish historians, writing that Poland of the 1930 did only theoretically 
pursue the equal distance policy, in effect being involved in cooperation with 
the German government. The author proves it by referring to the country’s 
policy during the Czechoslovakia crisis maintaining that the Polish leader­
ship expressed solidarity with Hitler’s Germany. However, it is worth noting 
that M. M. Narinsky’s approach is quite similar to the interpretation of Po­
land’s foreign policy given in Soviet historiography2.
A prime focus of the book is the beginning of World War II. So, S. D^b- 
ski places the responsibility for unleashing the war with the participants of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, without downplaying Hitler’s role in it. How­
ever, S. D^bski’s opinion that it was not only Germany, but also the USSR 
that violated international agreements and performed an act of aggression 
against Poland, is fully justified. This point of view is shared by N. S. Lebe­
deva, A. Przewoznik, and A. Glowacki, whereas M. M. Narinsky maintains 
that the tactical benefit derived by J. Stalin from the deal with A. Hitler in 
1939 turned to be a strategic defeat for Russia in 1941.
Another important issue is the repressions of Stalin’s reign. W. Materski 
points out that, since 1931, they were instituted, inter alia, against the Polish 
residing in the western regions of the USSR. However, he stresses that the 
Soviet leadership was guided by rather class than national considerations, 
since the Polish were not taken in by Soviet propaganda during collectivisa­
tion maintaining their political views and cultural individuality keeping a 
safe distance from socialist ideas. This point of view is supported by the 
Russian historian, N. S. Lebedeva, who emphasises that repressions against 
Polish prisoners of war and civilians were not a coincidence, but rather an
2 Istorija diplomatii [The history of diplomacy], Vol. 3, Diplomatija na pervom 
etape obwego krizisa kapitalisticheskoj sistemy [Diplomacy at the initial stage of 
general crisis of the capitalistic system], Moscow, p. 765.)
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element of soviétisation and depolonisation of the territories annexed in the 
autumn of 1939. So the opinion that Stalin’s repressions rested not on the 
national, but political and social considerations is shared by Polish and Rus­
sian researchers. It eliminates the opportunity for interpreting Stalin’s re­
pressions as genocide in the framework of international law, but makes it 
possible to class them as a crime against humanity.
Special attention in the book is paid to the history of the Katyn massacre. 
N. S. Lebedeva, A. Glowacki, and A. Przewoznik prove conclusively that it 
was administered by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) 
at the order of the political leadership of the USSR. In spite of the rules of 
international law, after Eastern Poland had been occupied, captive Polish 
soldiers were under the jurisdiction of NKVD; more than 20,000 of them 
were placed in camps and later executed. A. Przewoznik points out that most 
of the executed captives did not belong to the professional military person­
nel. They were people of different nationalities and civic occupations who 
became the first generation brought up in independent Poland. As I. S. Ya- 
zhobrovskaya emphasises, the Katyn case has not been concluded from ei­
ther legal or moral and political perspective and remains a sore point in the 
bilateral relations.
Special attention is paid to the post-war governance of Poland. 
A.F. Noskova believes that it depended not only on the Polish leaders, but, 
even to a greater degree, on the leaders of anti-Hitler coalition, who mo­
nopolised the right to shape the destiny of smaller states. Poland was to be­
come a member of the socialist bloc with the USSR exerting direct and 
strong influence on its politics and economy. However, as W. Borodziej 
stresses, in 1949— 1955, the Soviet leadership did not have a developed 
long-term policy towards Poland, everything was decided in the “manual 
mode”. At the same time, the Polish historian, A. Glowacki, when consider­
ing the positive effect of Soviet intervention into Polish affairs — the elimi­
nation of unemployment, the extension of the network of healthcare institu­
tions and a better access to education, art (cinema, theatre, and libraries) em­
phasises that, in general, the soviet transformations in the post-war govern­
ance of Poland were accompanied by squandering of natural resources, a 
decrease in productivity and living standards, poorer labour discipline, sup­
pression of Polish culture, eradication of traditional political institutions, and 
the spread of snitching and distrust.
A serious problem, according to the authors of the book, was the eco­
nomic aspects of further development of Poland and its relations with the 
USSR in the period of “people’s democracy”. A. F. Noskova stresses that the 
Polish economy of that time was based on compulsory control and political 
distribution of capital investment in favour of means of production and de­
fence industry, which stifled consumption delineating internal borders of its 
existence. The Polish researcher, J. Kalinski stresses that, until 1949, the 
USSR, resting on the arbitrary rule of Soviet high-rank military officers, ex­
ploited Polish economy by imposing a system of prices and transactions dif­
ferent from the world market.
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The USSR facilitated the development of heavy industry and the military 
industrial sector in Poland. As the Polish economist, Stanislaw Gomulka, 
wrote, in the 1950s, the country enjoyed a considerable trade surplus in agri­
cultural goods and subsoil resources, which made it possible to import more 
technologically advanced goods. Over the years of high industrialisation and 
urbanisation rates in Poland, the internal demand for agricultural goods, raw 
materials and subsoil resources for the growing industries was increasing 
much faster than their domestic production3. It resulted in the increasing de­
pendence of Poland on the supplies of raw materials from the USSR and en­
tailed a huge deficit in trade with the Union. But, as A.F. Noskova and 
W. Borodziej write, Soviet-style industrialisation and the forced rejection of 
the Marshall Plan was a payment for the recognition of the Polish border 
stretching along the Oder. Such economic system could not contribute to 
improving the welfare of the population and, hence, was not a promising 
model for the country’s further economic development.
The experience of political and economic post-socialistic transformations 
in Russia and Poland attracted considerable interest of scholars. First of all, 
the authors stress the differences in the ideological reference points of Polish 
and Russian ruling classes. The Polish political elite of today stemmed from 
the dissident circles of the times of the “people’s democracy” and was close­
ly connected to emigrant intellectual communities, having inherited their 
ideological concepts. The modern Russian establishment exhibits ideological 
connections to Soviet nomenklatura, which ignored dissident ideas. Perhaps, 
it affected the rate and scale of political and economic reforms in the two 
countries. In Poland, reforms commenced earlier than in the USSR. It had a 
positive effect on the further economic development of Poland. Moreover, as 
L.B. Vardomsky stresses, the Polish leadership was better at counting mon­
ey and did not engage, unlike the USSR, in ideological charity.
In Russia the problem of shortage of qualified and flexible politicians 
became acute in the 1990s. According to V.G. Baranovsky and B. A. Shme­
lev, Soviet economy was managed by Soviet economists, who could not im­
agine any other administrative methods than those developed by Gosplan. 
The new Russian elite did not want to use the old methods and could not use 
the new ones. Later, it became evident that Poland and Russia followed dif­
ferent paths of political and economic development: the former chose the 
liberal market model and the latter — authoritarian oligarchic capitalism.
An urgent question for the authors of the book is what kind of bilateral 
relations Poland and Russia develop today and what will become of these 
relations in future. The scholars emphasise that, today, Poland follows the 
path of establishing a liberal democratic state and participates in global and 
regional integration processes. The Polish society entered the 21st century 
having solved the problems of political, historical, and ideological legacy. In 
Russia, the situation is different: desovietisation did not take place, and the
3 Gomuika S. Specific and systemic causes of the Polish crisis, 1980— 1982 // 
Stanislaw Gomulka i transformacja polska: dokumenty i analizy 1968— 1989 / pod 
red. T. Kowalika. Warszawa, 2010. S. 917.
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democratic traditions are very weak. According to N.I. Bukharin, up to 50% 
of Russian nationals still identify themselves as Soviet people. Thus, it is 
easy to understand the scholars’ concerns about the fact that the current Rus­
sian governmental elite increasingly recognises and emphasises the connec­
tion between Soviet and Russian foreign policy. It raises concerns that Rus­
sia does not want to abandon the totalitarian past and nurtures an image of a 
successor to the communist state that rested on secret services. This fact had 
a negative influence not only on the development of Russian society, but al­
so Russian-Polish relations, since the international community is increas­
ingly convinced that Russia is changing on the outside remaining a Soviet 
state on the inside4.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the book under review is the first 
comprehensive research work on Russian-Polish relations in the 20th century 
that sets out to describe their history without intentional distortion and 
reaches accord on difficult issues. The book addresses acute and relevant 
topics giving rise to discussion and outlines possible topics for further re­
search. There are some contradictions in the description of historical events 
given by Polish and Russian authors, but these contradictions are openly ex­
pressed and do not reveal any conflict nature. One can easily notice that the 
scholars from both countries recognise a close connection between history 
and politics and aspire to fairly treat the problem of Russian-Polish relations 
and agree that further study will definitely require granting the other party 
access to the national archives and telling the truth. The book will be of in­
terest not only for specialists in international relations but for all those inter­
ested in the history of Russia and Poland.
Dr I. V. Gretsky,
Associate Professor, Department o f European Studies, 
Faculty o f International Relations, 
Saint Petersburg State University
PoccHHCKo-yKpaHHCKoe norpaHHHbe: flBa^aTb ^eT pa3ge- 
^eHHoro eflHHCTBa: M0H0rpa$HH / nog peg. B. A. K o .i o c o b î i , 
O. H. BeHgHHofi [The Russian-Ukrainian border area: twenty 
years of disrupted unity: a monograph / eds. V. A. Kolosov, 
O. I. Vendina]. M.: H o b h h  xpoHorpa^, 2011. 352 c.
Transborder cooperation between Russia and the neighbouring countries 
is a relatively new research topic for Russian economic geographers. Firstly, 
it can be explained by the fact that it is only after the collapse of the USSR, 
when the barrier function of the border weakened and the contact one in­
creased. Secondly, it relates to global trends towards the expansion of trans­
4 Walesa L  Moja III RP. Warszawa, 2007. S. 137.
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